The past decade has marked a period of significant development for pluralist theories of truth. This paper utilizes several distinctions to categorize the current theoretical landscape, and then compares the theoretical structure of four pluralist theories-namely, strong alethic pluralism, alethic disjunctivism, second-order functionalism, and manifestation functionalism. We conclude by arguing that it is difficult for adherents of the three other pluralist views to reject the viability of some form of alethic disjunctivism. By this we mean that, by the lights of each of these other views, there is a disjunctive truth property that ought to qualify as a legitimate truth property.
the analysans for something deemed more plausible-coherence, superassertability, agreement at the end of inquiry, concordance, and so forth. 2 Traditionalists meet opposition from two camps: deflationists and pluralists. Both camps construe the combination of monism and substantivism as being fundamentally misguided, but differ as to which of these two theses instigates the problem.
3 According to deflationists, truth does not have a deep underlying essence or substantive nature that can be subjected to rigorous analysis and which could go beyond our concept of it. Rather, all there is to say about truth is captured by the disquotational schema (DS), equivalence schema (ES), or operator schema (OS):
(DS) 'p' is true if, and only if, p.
(ES) 〈p〉 is true if, and only if, p.
(OS) it is true that p if, and only if, p.
Based on these or related schemas, deflationary analyses of predicative and attributive uses of 'true' suggest that truth is a merely expressive or logical device-one that is unlikely to participate in the explanation of other phenomena such as rationality, intentionality, meaning, or cognition. According to pluralists, however, the traditionalist's mistake is not that she takes correspondence, coherence, agreement at the end of inquiry, etc. to be legitimate objects of study in reductively analyzing the nature of truth. Rather, the mistake lies in assuming that studying one of these properties will exhaust what there is to say about 2 C. J. G. Wright posited superassertability as an epistemically-constrained property of truth, thereby improving upon similar posits advocated by Putnam and Peirce: 'a [proposition] is superassertable if, and only if, it is, or can be, warranted and some warrant for it would survive arbitrarily close scrutiny of its pedigree and arbitrarily extensive increments to or other forms of improvement of our information (Wright 1992, p. 48 ). Lynch presents concordance as a candidate for truth in the moral domain: 'p is concordant if, and only if, p supercoheres with a moral framework and that framework's morally-relevant non-moral judgments are true ' (2009: 175 ff) . 3 See Beall (forthcoming) for an example of a deflationary pluralist, however; see also Lynch (2009: 65) , who argues that C. J. G. Wright's version of discourse pluralism is, contrary to appearances, quite deflationary.
truth. While specific properties may be plausible truth candidates in certain domains, each of them falters in others, and so no single property can cover all there is to say about truth-apt discourse. For example, truths about concrete objects can plausibly be accounted for in terms of correspondence to fact, although correspondence appears much less plausible when it comes to accounting for truths in topology or business advertising. Thus, the explanatory scope of correspondence theories is not wide enough; and mutatis mutandis for other traditional views. 4 Viewed at this simplistic level of description, the relationship between these three camps can thus be understood as an inconsistent triad (see fig. 1 ). The traditionalist's conjunction of monism and substantivism is inconsistent with both the deflationism's rejection of substantivism and the pluralist's rejection of monism; the deflationist's conjunction of monism and insubstantivism is inconsistent with both the traditionalist's acceptance of substantivism and the pluralist's rejection of monism; and the pluralists's conjunction of substantivism and the rejection of monism is inconsistent with both the deflationism's acceptance of insubstantivism and the traditionalist's acceptance of monism. In parallel, we can distinguish between two versions of pluralism:
(SP) There is more than one truth property, and no truth property is possessed by all true propositions. (strong pluralism) (MP) There is more than one truth property. (moderate pluralism)
Strong monism entails a commitment to its moderate counterpart, but not vice versa. It is also incompatible with both versions of pluralism: if there is exactly one truth property, then obviously there cannot be more than one, as both strong and moderate pluralists contend. Likewise, strong pluralism entails a commitment to its moderate counterpart, but not vice versa. 6 And it too is Matters are different when we turn to the moderate versions of the two views. While moderate monism is incompatible with strong pluralism and moderate pluralism with strong monism, the two moderate theses are themselves compatible. The explanation is that the generic truth property to which the moderate monist is committed could be one among the several truth properties to which the moderate pluralist is committed.
Three kinds of moderate pluralism
In this section we present alethic disjunctivism, second-order functionalism, and manifestation functionalism-three 'mixed' or impure pluralist views that exemplify the compatibility of moderate pluralism and moderate monism about
Theorists attracted to pluralism about truth concepts include, among others, Max Kölbel (cf. 2008, forthcoming) and C. D. Wright (2010, forthcoming) . Some critics of C. J. G. Wright also seemed to read him in this way (see, e.g., Pettit 1996; Sainsbury 1996) . However, we agree with Lynch's interpretation that Wright, who explicitly says as much (1996, p. 924) , is not a simple alethic pluralist so defined. Rather, he is pretty clearly a moderate pluralist in the sense of (MP), although some have interpreted him as a strong pluralist, too (see Wright 1992, pp. 141-3; 2001, pp. 752-3) . However, (SP) can be attributed to Wright only if he rejects the existence of a generic truth property. While Lynch (2006, §3; 2009, pp. 59-62) attributes such a rejection to him on the basis of his earlier work, it is unclear-in our view-whether this work includes enough detail to render such a verdict one way or the other. See Wright (forthcoming) for his most recent take on pluralism. truth. We start by reviewing an approach to conceptual analysis that serves as common ground between many pluralists.
Concept delineation via core principles
The predominant approach to the conceptual analysis of truth has utilized collections of principles-or 'platitudes' or 'truisms', as they are sometimes called (Wright, 1992; Lynch, 2005c Lynch, , 2009 Unfortunately, no philosopher has yet developed a sufficiently rich account of what it means to say that some p is a truism or a platitude. For criticism of the appeal to platitudes and truisms, see Sher (1998 Sher ( , 2004 Sher ( , 2005 and Wright (2005 Wright ( , 2010 . 9 See Lynch (2009: 8, 10, 12) . It should be noted that Lynch states (O) and (EI) in terms of beliefs, while (NB) is put in terms of propositions (which he takes to be the proper and primary truthbearer (2009, pp. 129-32) ). Also noteworthy is that, as stated by Lynch, (O) and (NB) are schemas, while (EI) has the form of a universal generalization. Here, we adopt the regimented formulation provided by David (forthcoming).
According to Lynch, objectivity, norm of belief, and end of inquiry are nonnegotiable in the sense that if anything is to be a theory of truth-as opposed to a theory of something else-then it must include these three principles (2009, p. 17 Wright (2005 Wright ( , 2010 has argued that this methodological approach gives rise to a criteria problem: differences between concepts of truth are determined by the identity and individuation conditions of the conjunctions (lists, etc.) of core principles, and as the conjuncts (items, etc.) change so too do the concepts.
In the absence of criteria for respectively inclusion in and exclusion from the list of core principles, it is thus questionable whether pluralists are entitled to monism about the concept of truth. 11 In this paper we set aside the criteria problem, however, and discuss a number of other issues pertaining to pluralism in § §3-5.
Alethic disjunctivism
We now turn to alethic disjunctivism, the first moderate pluralist view that combines moderate pluralism and moderate monism about truth. 12 Qua pluralism, alethic disjunctivism postulates several domain-specific truth
properties T 1 , …, T n ; yet, with monism, the view also postulates a generic truth property T G , characterized as follows: 
Second-order functionalism
According to functionalists, the concept of truth is best characterized by looking at the role that it plays in our cognitive economy. That is, we look for widelyalthough perhaps tacitly-endorsed principles that connect truth to other concepts (Lynch 2001 (Lynch , 2004 (Lynch , 2009 . By reference to these core principles, we can 13 Now, precisely because talk of domains is strictly needed, we will often allow ourselves to leave it implicit. For example, we often allow ourselves to talk about a proposition's being generically true in virtue of, e.g., corresponding to fact without tediously adding that correspondence is the truth property for the domain to which the proposition belongs.
specify what it means for a property to play the truth-role relative to a given domain:
(TR) For any property F, F plays the truth-role relative to domain i if, and only if, for every proposition p in domain i , F satisfies the salient principles for p.
In turn, (TR) positions one to provide a functionalist characterization of the conditions under which a proposition is true (Lynch 2000 (Lynch , 2004 -but with some significant differences; see fns. 14-15):
(F TC ) For every proposition p, p is true if, and only if, p has the property that plays the truth-role for the domain to which p belongs.
According to the second-order functionalist, (F TC ) points us directly to what truth-considered as a property-is. It is a certain second-order property, the role-property (Lynch 2001 (Lynch , 2004 (Lynch , 2005a : only if, were p to be believed, things would be believed to be as they are, (ii) it is prima facie correct to believe p if, and only if, p is F, and (iii) other things being equal, if p is F, then believing p is a worthy goal of inquiry.
Whatever specific set of principles the second-order functionalist endorses, she will say that the properties that play the truth-role are first-order realizer properties-in the jargon familiar from the philosophy of mind-while truth itself is a second-order multiply realizable property. (We will occasionally use 'T 2OF '.) T 2OF is a second-order property because a proposition's having it is always grounded in the possession of a property in the set of realizer properties-i.e., a property that plays the truth-role for the domain to which the proposition belongs. 14 T 2OF is a multiply realizable property because different properties (correspondence, supercoherence, etc.) play the truth-role for different domains, and so truth can be realized in different ways across domains.
Like alethic disjunctivism, second-order alethic functionalism combines moderate pluralism and monism about truth. The view is moderately pluralist in the sense that there are several properties in virtue of which propositions can be true. This is because truth is multiply realizable. Yet, truth's multiple realizability concomitantly underwrites the moderate monism of second-order functionalism:
the second-order, multiply realizable property T 2OF is had by all true propositions.
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Manifestation functionalism
We now 
16 At least one of the authors finds the assumption of uniqueness in (T M ) problematic. For now, we will grant the idea that (T M ) characterizes a unique truth property. For further discussion, see §6 and Pedersen (forthcoming-a).
From (M) it follows immediately that the manifestation relation is reflexive, because any set is a subset of itself. Conceptually essential features of a given property F are thought to (i) be part of the nominal essence of F, (ii) hold of F with conceptual necessity, and (iii) serve to distinguish F from other properties.
(M) and (I) are presented as capturing a new kind of metaphysical grounding relation-one which is distinct from the determinable/determinate, type/token, and genus/species distinctions, among others. 17 Let us turn to the case where the immanent property is truth. The thought is that alethic properties like correspondence are truth-manifesting properties, i.e., properties that manifest truth or in which truth is immanent. This is the relationship that truth, as Lynch now relativizes manifestation to propositions. 18 What specific property manifests truth for a given proposition depends on its subject matter and its logical structure. Let us turn first to atomic propositions. Consider the following thesis stating a necessary and sufficient condition for the truth of atomics where manifestation is understood as above.
17 See Lynch (2009, pp. 67, 75) . For a different conception of immanence, see Sher (2004) and Sher & Wright (2007) . 18 Previously, Lynch (2009, pp. 76-7) relativized manifestation to domains. The switch from relativization to domains to relativization to propositions has been suggested by David (forthcoming), among others.
(T CA ) For any atomic proposition p, p is true if, and only if, p has the property M that manifests truth for p and is distinct from truth.
As noted, truth always manifests itself, because manifestation is reflexive.
However, (T CA ) tells us that what matters for atomic propositions is that there is some further truth-manifesting alethic property that p has. In such cases, we will say that the truth of p is strongly grounded. (T CA ) tells us is that atomic truths are exactly the strongly grounded-or, as Lynch would say, 'unplain'-truths.
The manifestation functionalist does not hold (T CA ) in full generality.
Shapiro (forthcoming) argues that there are atomic, plain truths-i.e., truths that are atomic but which are not strongly grounded-and Lynch (forthcoming) agrees. In particular, truth-attributions such as it is true that grass is green are atomic and yet plainly true. Hence, they are not true in virtue of possessing some truth-manifesting property other than truth. For this reason there is no exact match between the atomic truths and the unplain truths. Still, Lynch seems sympathetic to the idea that even atomic, plain truths somehow depend on unplain ones. Thus, he takes the truth-value of it is true that grass is green to depend on the truth-value of grass is green, an atomic unplain truth.
What about compound or complex propositions? According to the manifestation functionalist, these propositions are plainly true, where this is to be understood as follows:
A proposition p is plainly true just in case it is true and does not have any property distinct from truth that manifests truth for it.
(plain truth)
To take an example, consider the conjunctive proposition Earth is spherical and two plus two equals four. This proposition is true. Suppose that correspondence is the truth-manifesting property for the first conjunct and coherence for the second one. The truth of both conjuncts is strongly grounded: they each have a property distinct from truth in virtue of which they are true. However, neither correspondence nor coherence manifests truth for the conjunction. Instead the conjunction is plainly true. The conjunction is true, and truth self-manifests, but the conjunction possesses no further truth-manifesting property.
Levels and grounding
Alethic disjunctivism and second-order functionalism
We will return to plain and unplain truths in §4. Here, notice that strong alethic pluralism is a one-level view, in the sense that the extant truth properties posited by the view have no special status with respect to their applicability. They are all alethic properties within which truth consists relative to particular domains. On the other hand, alethic disjunctivism, second-order functionalism, and manifestation functionalism can be regarded as two-level views. At least one of the properties among the manifold of other ways of being true has an exalted status.
For instance, according to alethic disjunctivism, among the disjunct properties there is a unique, generic disjunctive truth property, T G . For second-order functionalism, among the realizer properties at the lower order, there is the second-order truth property, T 2OF . Finally, according to manifestation functionalism, the manifesting properties have a status that is distinct from immanent truth, T I . With respect to two-level views, it is an interesting issue how properties that have this special or exalted status relate to those that do not. Lynch (2009) and Pedersen (2010) suggest that the metaphysical link between them is a grounding relation, although they differ over the details. Let us dwell on the idea of metaphysical grounding for a bit. 19 First, we will take grounding to be (strongly) asymmetric, i.e.,
Second, we will also take grounding to be irreflexive, i.e.
(IR) For all x, it is not the case that F(x) grounds F(x). (irreflexitivity)
We take these two features to underwrite certain explanatory claims. If F for every proposition p, p is true if and only if p has the property that plays the truth-role for the domain to which p belongs.)
We conclude from the above considerations that lower-level truth grounds higher-level truth on the alethic disjunctivist and second-order functionalist views. Whenever a proposition has the disjunctive truth property, it is because it has the disjunct truth property of the domain to which it belongs, and not vice-versa; likewise for the second-order functionalist's role and realizer properties, mutatis mutandis. Does the same hold of Lynch's manifestation functionalism? The answer to this question is not straightforward.
Manifestation functionalism
There may seem to be a tension between our presentation of grounding and Lynch's talk of manifestation-which, as indicated, he considers to be a kind of grounding relation. The seeming tension is this: we have taken grounding relations to be irreflexive, while Lynch explicitly says that manifestation is reflexive. Every property manifests itself, because for any property it is a priori that the set of its essential features is a subset of the set of its essential features.
For a certain class of propositions, the tension is only apparent. The reflexitivity of manifestation (as applied to properties) is compatible with the grounding of truth (as applied to propositions) being irreflexive. Consider, for example, the class of atomic unplain truths. Atomic, unplain truths are (immanence) true, T I , and also have a further distinct truth-manifesting property M i . Now, truth manifests itself for propositions that are unplainly true, as does any other property possessed by these propositions. But the fact that truth selfmanifests for any proposition p that is atomic and unplainly true does not make it the case that T I (p) grounds T I (p). Rather, we must look to the further, distinct truth-manifesting property M i for grounding:
Indeed, for any atomic unplain truth p, the manifestation functionalist will say the following: One way of avoiding a self-sufficiency claim would be to take plain truth to be asymmetrically dependent or supervenient on unplain truth:
(PT S ) Plain truth supervenes on unplain truth: a plain truth cannot change its truth-value without there being a change in the truthvalue of some true atomic proposition whose truth is strongly grounded (i.e., due to the possession of some truth-manifesting property distinct from truth).
If (PT S ) holds good on the manifestation functionalist picture, plain truth can be regarded as being weakly grounded on unplain truth. Plain truths are not directly or strongly grounded in the possession of some truth-manifesting property distinct from truth. Yet they depend or supervene on truths that are grounded.
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In particular, one can say that the plain truth of the truth attribution "it is true that grass is green' supervenes on the unplain truth of 'grass is green" (as does Lynch Where does this leave the manifestation functionalist? Supervenience, like grounding, is a kind of metaphysical dependence relation. Thus, the manifestation functionalist can say that all truths-whether plain or unplaindepend for their truth on lower-level truth-manifesting properties distinct from (immanence) truth. However, it should be emphasized that the manifestation functionalist's dependence relation is subject to a significant bifurcation. Dependence-as-supervenience strikes us as unclear compared to dependence-as-strong-grounding. In other words, in our view, one half of the manifestation functionalist's bifurcated metaphysics is somewhat obscure. 
The priority of pluralism: the many grounding the one
Apart from strong alethic pluralism, the other views we have considered are impure or mixed: they incorporate both moderate pluralism and moderate monism. This raises an interesting question: are these views more pluralist than monist, or more monist than pluralist? Or perhaps equally so? Here, we argue that mixed pluralist views (of the kind considered) are distinctively more pluralist than monist. The previous section has provided a rationale for thinking so. 23 We first turn to alethic disjunctivism and second-order functionalism, then to manifestation functionalism. 22 Another very interesting proposal concerning alethic pluralism and grounding is that of Edwards (forthcoming) . See Wright (forthcoming) for discussion of Edwards' proposal. 23 The argument to be given is an extension of the kind of argument presented in Pedersen (2010) , where the focus is specifically on alethic disjunctivism rather than mixed pluralist views more generally.
Recall that alethic disjunctivism incorporates the thesis that there is a generic, disjunctive truth property (T G ) that applies to all true propositions.
Recall also that the view commits to the existence of a plurality of truth properties T 1 , …, T n . As seen in the preceding section, for any proposition p, T G (p)
is always strongly grounded in T i (p) for some T i (1 ≤ i ≤ n). That is, generic truth is always strongly grounded in domain-specific truth. A proposition is generically true because it has the truth property of the domain to which it belongs. These relations are not reversible. It is not the case that
and it is not the case that T i (p) obtains because T G (p). So, although T G (p)
and T i (p) are biconditionally related, there is an asymmetry: T i (p) is metaphysically prior to T G (p). In other words, the domain-specific properties are more fundamental than the disjunctive property. In light of this result, we conclude that alethic disjunctivism is distinctively more pluralist than monist.
What we have said just about alethic disjunctivism equally applies to secondorder functionalism. The reasoning is similar, with the possession of the realizer property of the relevant domain serving to ground strongly the possession of the second-order functional truth property. As before, the lower-order properties are thus metaphysically more fundamental than the higher-order property. Hence, second-order functionalism is distinctively more pluralist than monist.
How about manifestion functionalism, the third mixed view? This view, too, is more pluralist than monist from a metaphysical point of view. Yet, the possession of the higher-order truth property is not generally as strongly grounded in lower-level truth properties as on the two other mixed views. Recall that the only truth property plain truths have is the immanent truth property, T I .
However, as also seen, plain truth supervenes on unplain truth-i.e., on some truth that is directly grounded in the possession of some truth-manifesting property distinct from (immanent) truth. In this sense, unplain truth and the truth-manifesting properties are more metaphysically fundamental than the higher-level truth property.
In sum, for all three mixed views considered, the pluralist aspect of these views is more fundamental than its monism. The many ground the one.
On the viability of alethic disjunctivism
In this section, we support the claim made at the outset of the paper-namely, that some form of alethic disjunctivism is viable by the lights of each of the other three pluralist views considered above. It is so in the sense that it is hard for these other kinds of pluralists to deny the legitimacy of a disjunctive truth property. We make our case for this claim against the background assumption that the truth concept is characterized by a collection of core principles. As seen, this is an assumption shared by many pluralists.
Alethic disjunctivism and strong alethic pluralism
Recall that the strong pluralist accepts the existence of a range of domain-specific truth properties T 1 , …, T n . Some authors have argued that the strong pluralist can reject the legitimacy of a generic disjunctive truth property-one that takes T 1 , …,
T n as disjuncts-on metaphysical grounds. 24 The basic idea behind this strategy is that the strong pluralist can think of truth properties as sparse rather than abundant properties. Here, we suggest that this is not a viable strategy.
According to the abundant conception, for any set of things, there is a property possessed by exactly the members of that set. 25 Thus, in particular, the following holds: Instantiating (A ∨ ) with truth properties T 1 , …, T n immediately delivers a disjunctive property that applies precisely to the things that possess one of T 1 , …,
Here it might seem natural to think that viewing truth properties in a conservative manner-as being sparse rather than abundant-can be of help to the strong pluralist who wants to reject the existence of this disjunctive property.
According to the sparse conception of properties, objects need to be qualitatively similar in order to share a property. In particular, the propositions that are supposed to possess the disjunctive truth property must be unified by a qualitative similarity. The sparse conception is thus more restrictive or conservative than the abundant conception. For this reason, if truth properties are regarded as sparse properties, the generic disjunctive property has to satisfy a substantive constraint in order to qualify as legitimate from a metaphysical point of view. As such, provided that the strong pluralist can show that the propositions that possess some domain-specific truth property fail to be unified 25 The set {Anthony Soprano, aleph null, California's Lost Coast, the rise of Manicheanism} is populated with arbitrarily collected and unrelated elements spanning a wide range of metaphysical categories (e.g., fictitious persons, numbers, locations, events, etc.), and could be repopulated to include many others (e.g., tropes, moral facts, possible worlds, etc.). Subsequently, it may be that abundant theorists should restrict the scope of allowable sets; otherwise, it would appear that the only property that members of abundantly-construed sets share is (mere) set membership. Set membership is not an alethic property, however; and so neither is having the property of being a member of {T 1 , …, T n }.
by the requisite qualitative similarity, she will have a principled metaphysical reason to reject the generic disjunctive truth property.
Unfortunately, this line of reasoning does not look plausible given the assumption that the concept of truth is characterized by a collection of core principles (to be supplemented with principles connecting concepts with properties), and that T 1 , …, T n qualify as truth properties in virtue of satisfying these principles. For if the assumption holds, then satisfying the core principles is sufficient to satisfy this constraint of qualitative similarity that the generic disjunctive property has to satisfy in order to qualify as metaphysically legitimate. In light of this, it seems hard to deny the metaphysical viability of some form of alethic disjunctivism, even by the lights of the strong pluralist. The satisfaction of the core principles would appear to deliver precisely the kind of qualitative similarity that is required to make a disjunctive property like T G metaphysically viable according to the sparse conception.
Thus, the increased degree of conservativeness that goes with this conception looks unhelpful to the strong pluralist. It does not put her in a position to rule out the legitimacy of the disjunctive truth property on metaphysical grounds.
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If the strong pluralist has no means of resisting commitment to T G , her view collapses into alethic disjunctivism. Since strong pluralism is the only pure form of pluralism, a further conclusion suggests itself: pure pluralist positions cannot be upheld by appealing to metaphysical considerations of the sort just presented. In turn, unless other defensive maneuvres are available to fend off the 26 The line of argument just presented contravenes Pedersen (2006) , which presents a form of strong pluralism and tries to resist the generic, disjunctive truth property by appealing to the sparse conception of properties. Pedersen (2010) leaves the issue open. Conversations with Edwards and Lynch have convinced one author-Pedersen-that the disjunctive truth property cannot be ruled out by appealing to the sparse conception, for just these reasons. The other author-Wright-is unconvinced that the presented line of reasoning is compelling; see Wright (2011) for further details.
challenge from alethic disjunctivism, this means that the only tenable positions in the pluralist landscape are of a mixed character-ones that incorporate both moderate pluralism and moderate monism (the former because of the domainspecific truth properties T 1 , …, T n , the latter because of the generic disjunctive property T G ). This is a significant conclusion, as it decreases the territory that can be tenably held by the pluralist.
Alethic disjunctivism and second-order functionalism
It is difficult for the second-order functionalist to deny the legitimacy of some form of alethic disjunctivism. The second-order functional truth proerty, T 2OF , and the disjunctive truth property, T G , are sufficiently similar that it would be quite odd for the second-order functionalist to endorse the existence of the former, while rejecting the existence of the latter. They are sufficiently similar in the sense of being necessarily co-extensional.
Let us start by considering the claim that T 2OF and T G are co-extensional, turning afterwards to the necessity claim. Let R 1 , …, R n be the properties that the second-order functionalist takes to play the truth-role for domain 1 , …, domain n .
Let T G be the property of being either R 1 (and belonging to domain 1 ), or …, or R n (and belonging to domain n ). Recall that the second-order functionalist's favored property is T 2OF , the property of having a property that plays the truth-role (for the relevant domain). Consider now the properties T 2OF and T G . These properties are co-extensional:
(EQV) For all p, p ∈ ext(T G ) if, and only if, p ∈ ext(T 2OF ).
and domain i (p) for some R i among R 1 , …, R n . But R i plays the truth-role for domain i to which p belongs. So, p has the property of having a property that plays the truth-role for its domain. Hence, p ∈ ext(T 2OF ).
⇐ Suppose that p ∈ ext(T 2OF ). Then p has the property R i that plays the truth-role for domain i to which p belongs. By the characterization of
Further, note that the disjunct-disjunction relationship between, on the one hand, R 1 , …, R n and T G on the other holds of necessity since being T G is simply defined as being either R 1 (and belonging to domain 1 ), or …, or being R n (and belonging to domain n ). Similarly, propositions belong to domains necessarily and each of the domain-specific properties R 1 , …, R n plays the truth-role relative to their respective domains necessarily. Given these necessary connections, we can strengthen the conclusion that T 2OF and T G are co-extensional to the conclusion that they are co-extensional necessarily. 27 For familiar reasons owing to Kripke, necessary co-extension seems to be required for identity between properties.
Presumably, however, it falls short of being sufficient. Yet, it does make them similar to enough suggest that it is odd to think that only T 2OF exists. What is needed reasonably to suppose that this is so is an independent reason for thinking that T 2OF exists, whereas T G does not. Is such a reason available? We think that an independent reason that supports the opposite conclusion is available. Both T 2OF and T G apply to propositions that have a property satisfying the truisms or platitudes delineating the truth concept, assuming with the second-order functionalist that the platitude-based strategy is adopted. As such, T 2OF and T G apply to things that are qualitatively similar. This, in turn, makes it 27 Think of the property of being an odd number divisible by 2 with 0 remainder and the property of being an integer solution to the equation x = √2. In all possible worlds these two properties have nothing in their extension, and so, they are necessarily co-extensional. Yet, they are not identical.
difficult to see why they should not both be ontologically admissible, even from the point of view of someone who occupies a conservative stance with respect to property ontology. But notice that the two properties are on a par in this regard, and so, that it would be quite odd to suppose that only one of them exists.
The above argument suggests that second-order functionalism and some form of alethic disjunctivism are notational variants, or at the very least that they are similar to some significant degree. There is convergence in two important respects. First, recall that we have proceeded on the assumption that pluralistsincluding alethic disjunctivists-take domain-specific truth properties to be properties that satisfy a set of core principles. But for a property to satisfy these principles relative to a given domain is for that property to play the truth-role relative to that domain, i.e. for it to have precisely the feature that the secondorder functionalist takes to be distinctive of domain-specific truth properties.
Second, although the disjunctive property of being R 1 (and belonging to domain 1 ), or …, or being R n (and belonging to domain n ) is intensionally different from the property of having a property satisfying the truth-role, we have just seen that there is a strong connection between these properties from an extensionally point of view: they are necessarily co-extensional. Put together these two points support the conclusion that there is a high degree of similarity between alethic disjunctivism and second-order functionalism. Given this high degree of similarity we submit that it would be odd for the second-order functionalist to maintain that her view is viable, while at the same time rejecting the viability of alethic disjunctivism. 
Alethic disjunctivism and manifestation functionalism
We now turn to manifestation functionalism. Below it is argued that the manifestation functionalist cannot deny the legitimacy of the generic disjunctive truth property.
According to the manifestation functionalist, truth is the property that has the truish features as a matter of necessity-that is, 'the property that is, necessarily, had by believed contents just when things are as they are believed to be; had by propositions believed at the end of inquiry and which makes propositions correct to believe' (Lynch forthcoming, p. 13 in ms). As seen earlier, according to Lynch, a property must have the truish features in order to qualify as a truth property. We will now argue that the disjunctive truth property, T G , has the truish features necessarily, and so is just like the truth property envisioned by the manifestation functionalist. Now recall that T G is characterized as follows:
and that (SAT) The domain-specific truth properties T 1 , …, T n satisfy the truisms.
We are entitled to assume (SAT) because the manifestation functionalist takes domain-specific truth properties like correspondence and superwarrant to qualify as truth properties in virtue of satisfying the truisms.
Let us now turn to Objectivity. We break our argument into two parts, one for each direction of the biconditional: (SAT)
(5) If things are believed to be as they are if p is believed, then
(1),
Since p was arbitrary, we get the desired result by combining ⇒ and ⇐. That is, for all p, p is T G if, and only if, things are believed to be as they are if p is believed.
The arguments for norm of belief and end of inquiry are similar, and included in Appendix A. We get that, necessarily, T G has the truish features (or necessarily satisfies the truisms), because we have relied only on the characterization of T G , (SAT), and basic logical reasoning. The disjunctdisjunction relationship between T 1 , …, T n holds as a matter of conceptual necessity since the characterization of T G simply says that to be T G is to be either T 1 (and belong to domain 1 ), or …, or be T n (and belong to domain n ). (SAT) also holds of necessity because propositions belong to domains necessarily and each of the domain-specific properties T 1 , …, T n plays the truth-role relative to their respective domains necessarily. These things combined imply that there is no way that T G can fail to have the truish features.
The argument just presented shows that the disjunctive truth property T G has the characteristic that defines truth on the manifestation functionalist view, i.e. necessary possession of the truish features. As such, the manifestation functionalist should recognize the disjunctive truth property as a legitimate truth property. It would be quite odd for her to reject the property as being illegitimate-or not a proper candidate for truth-when it passes muster by her own lights.
29 29 Three things deserve to be mentioned. First, the conclusion that T G satisfies the truisms and does so necessarily puts pressure on Lynch's use of the definite article in the characterization of manifestation functionalist truth. At least it does so, given his rejection of the idea that T G is a viable candidate for functionalist truth. For a more elaborate argument against Lynch on this point, see Pedersen (forthcoming-a) . Second, the argument just given can be modified so it applies in the case of the second-order functional truth property, too. See Appendix B for details. This point is highly relevant to Lynch (2009) , because one of Lynch's main reasons for moving away from second-order functionalism and adopt manifestation functionalism instead is his contention that T 2O fails to have the truish features. Third, the argument just given can be used to account for the unity of truth on the alethic disjunctivist view. One might reasonably wonder what unifies the domain-specific-or disjunct-truth properties T 1 , …, T n . For instance, just like Lynch worries whether the secondorder functionalist property has the truish features, one might wonder whether T G really has these features. We take ourselves to have shown that T G does indeed have these features. This puts the alethic disjunctivist in a position to answer the question of unity: truths have something substantial in common. They all have a property that, necessarily, has the truish features.
Conclusion
We have pursued and executed a number of tasks in this paper. First, we have provided a survey of much of the pluralist landscape. We take it that the distinctions between moderate and strong versions of monism and pluralism, respectively, exhaust logical space. However, we also take it that the four specific varieties of pluralism discussed here do not exhaust the pluralist part of that space; conspicuously absent, for example, are the views of Sher, Horgan et al., and other correspondence pluralists. Still, the four varieties surveyed should be of particular interest in that they are prominent in the pluralist literature. Second, we hope to have illuminated the three mixed pluralist views-alethic disjunctivism, second-order functionalism, and manifestation functionalism-by discussing the idea of metaphysical grounding that is an integral part of each of them. Although they all incorporate a monist thesis, as the discussion made clear, they are distinctively more pluralist than monist from a metaphysical point of view. Again, to use a slogan: the many ground the one. We also hope to have made a case for thinking that alethic disjunctivism is relatively compelling-that the three other kinds of pluralist will find it hard to reject the viability of the view. For the strong pluralist, the generic disjunctive truth property suggests itself, because it should be admitted into the ontology even by conservative standards with respect to property ontology. 30 It will be difficult for the secondorder functionalist to resist alethic disjunctivism, because her favored truth property and the disjunctive truth property turn out to be quite similar. Lastly, the disjunctive truth property has the truish features as a matter of necessitywhich on the manifestation functionalist view is the key characteristic of truth. One of Lynch's main reasons for moving away from second-order functionalism and adopt manifestation functionalism instead is that he takes T 2O not to have the truish features (2009, pp. 64-6) . As such, in his view, it fails to be a truth property properly so-called. The argument we have just provided suggests that Lynch has concluded too swiftly that the truth property of second-order functionalism fails in this respect (even if it fails in others-see Wright, 2010) .
